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Abstract
The article by Oortwijn, Jansen, and Baltussen (OJB) is much more important than it appears because, in the 
absence of any good general theory of “evidence-informed deliberative processes” (EDP) and limited evidence 
of how they might be shaped and work in institutionalising health technology assessment (HTA), the best 
approach seems to be to accumulate the experience of a variety of countries, preferably systematically, from 
which some general principles might subsequently be inferred. This comment reinforces their arguments and 
provides a further example.
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The article by Oortwijn, Jansen and Baltussen (henceforth OJB)1 has modest ambitions but is much more important than this might imply. The ambition 
was to sample health technology assessment (HTA) agencies 
around the world and ask them to describe how they used 
“evidence-informed deliberative processes” (EDP) for 
decision-making in their countries. OJB’s emphasis is less 
on evidence information and much more on the processes, 
which seems appropriate given the current imbalance which 
they report in the literature. They are unnecessarily apologetic 
about the representative nature of their sample since the aim 
is neither to test a hypothesis nor to record the prevalence 
of the various constituents of “process” but rather to provide 
information and examples drawn from long-established 
agencies (relatively speaking) and recently established ones. 
A major finding is that the majority seem to be comfortable 
with the cost-effectiveness (CE) elements of HTA, where 
there is a large literature on the theory and methods for 
applying it, but that they are somewhat at sea with the design 
and implementation of processes of EDP, where there is no 
literature of anything like the extent and quality of that on CE.
My first comment is on the introduction of yet another term 
for deliberative processes – “EDP.” I have elsewhere2 ridiculed 
the needless proliferation of terms for “CE analysis.” The term 
“deliberative process” has been well-defined for years as an 
approach “intended to improve the quality of decision-making 
by allowing for mutual decision-making based on facts.”3 It is 
borrowed from previous concepts of deliberative democracy 
[eg, Elster4] which used the term “deliberative methods.” 
In fact their neologism brings out what I now think to be 
a defect in the former definition, with its focus on “fact” or 
“evidence.” Deliberation is indeed a useful way of teasing out 
and interpreting evidence but it is no less useful at teasing out 
and interpreting matters of value. So to circumscribe it is both 
unnecessary and misleading.
Secondly, I do not share their relative confidence with the 
availability of CE. My own impression is that while most 
countries will have at least a handful of academic experts who 
are entirely competent in CE, they are (a) only a handful, and 
(b) usually rather remote from the real world of practical use 
of CE in making public decisions. The staffing of ministries 
and arm’s length agencies in most low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) is also characteristically weak on the 
technical side of CE, which makes them less than fully 
competent commissioners of research evidence, evaluators of 
the quality of research evidence, and interpreters of evidence 
generated outside their country. The perception that little 
guidance is required on the technical side is not therefore a 
very good guide to what may in fact be a significant weakness 
wherever there is no established technical tradition in academia 
or the training of civil servants. Training programmes are 
required, especially in LMICs – perhaps on a regional rather 
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than a national basis – which as much as possible use the 
skills of the “handful” locally. The model of sending bright 
young potential analysts abroad at public (or donor) expense, 
usually to rich countries, often fails completely as a way of 
developing local capacity, since many make their subsequent 
careers either abroad or in the private sector.
The process element is undoubtedly a challenge. This 
concerns both institutionalisation – the creation of institutions 
to do the work (or some element of it) and maintenance – 
supporting ongoing programmes of work and learning from 
doing what works best. Understanding how best to make 
arrangements (that are cost-effective) immediately takes one 
to a highly complex academic and professional crossroads 
of behavioural science (to predict, for example, the likely 
behaviour of all the many stakeholder groups involved 
and affected by the decisions in question); governance (to 
predict, for example, the consequences of having, or not 
having, political accountability, advisory versus decisive 
powers, public participation in decision-making, a degree of 
independence from political and professional “authorities,” 
appeals mechanisms, security against conflicts of interest, 
and like mechanisms); political philosophy (to assess, for 
example, the desirability of independence, the delegation by 
ministers of important public decisions, the desirability for 
its own sake of transparency); political science (to anticipate, 
for example, political hazards, to engage with external agents 
like universities, medical colleges and regulatory authorities); 
the law (to ensure, for example, that all structures are 
consistent with the constitution and all processes are in line 
with statutory obligations and natural justice); administrative 
theory (to understand for example, committee structures that 
are best suited to the circumstances, committee decision rules 
like simple majority voting or powers of veto, skills required 
of committee chairs); industrial economics (to optimise 
relationships with pharmaceutical and other manufacturers 
and their national associations, investigate pricing strategies 
and their consequences for innovation and domestic 
industry); and communications (to learn, for example, how 
best to communicate both processes and decisions to the 
clinical professions, health service managers, patient advocacy 
groups and, of course, the general public).
This lattice of disciplines and professions militates against 
there being any single unifying “theory of deliberative 
processes” so one needs to add other requirement: 
imagination and descriptive evidence. The design and 
execution of deliberative processes requires imaginative work 
by people well-grounded in the practical realities of their own 
culture and politics[1] and a systematic accretion of descriptive 
material from which, over time, one may be able to infer some 
general principles.
An Example – the Early Days of NICE5 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) was created in 1999 to provide authoritative advice 
for supporting the introduction (and continuation) of clinical 
governance[2] in the National Health Service (NHS) in England 
and Wales. It followed a period in which there had been 
publicised professional scandals in hospitals and considerable 
resultant weakening of popular trust in the medical profession 
– and, for that matter – in “experts” generally. NICE was 
a form of direct democracy, with substantive decision 
being delegated to it by Ministers, much consultation and 
collaboration with those identified as stakeholders7 and lots of 
volunteer human resources. There were no real precedents on 
which the designers of NICE could draw; they were sensitive 
to the politics of the day and made guesses as to what might 
work. The secretary of state of the day (Frank Dobson) said, 
when asked whether he thought NICE would work, “possibly 
not but it’s worth a bloody good try.”
NICE sought to be a model of a deliberative process in a 
number of ways. These were mostly ad hoc, with the founders 
drawing on their own personal and professional experience:
•	 There would be open Board meetings to take place bi-
monthly around the regions in England and Wales, 
accompanied by public receptions and ‘Question and 
Answer’ sessions with the chair.
•	 Minutes would be published on the NICE web pages 
before confirmation by the Board.
•	 The chair and others ensured that opposition parties 
were fully informed about NICE’s processes and current 
activity, to avoid NICE being too strongly associated with 
one political party.
•	 There was a Partners’ Council. This met once a year to 
review NICE’s annual report. In the early days it was a 
source of advice and a forum for exchanging ideas and 
developing the future plans for NICE. Its membership 
included representatives from organizations with a 
special interest in its work such as patient groups, health 
professionals, NHS management, quality organizations, 
industry, and trade unions. Members were appointed by 
the Secretary of State for Health (English minister) and 
the Welsh Assembly Government. It was abolished after a 
few years having served a useful function in getting NICE 
respectably off the ground.
•	 There would be a Patient Involvement Unit to advise NICE 
on patient and caregiver involvement, identify patient 
and caregiver organizations interested in contributing 
to its work programme, and to promote patient and 
caregiver contributions by offering training and support 
for lay people, patients, caregivers and their organizations 
contributing to the NICE work programme.
•	 There would be a Citizens’ Council. This was a form 
of ‘citizens’ jury’ that considered socially value-laden 
matters referred to it by the NICE Board. Its 30 members 
had no economic involvement in the health care system 
and were selected to be representative of the regions 
and demographic characteristics of England and Wales. 
Members were paid modestly per day plus travel and 
subsistence expenses. It met twice a year, adopted a 
deliberative approach and could call witnesses and 
commission papers. It was managed, for independence, 
at arm’s length from NICE by a company specializing in 
research and community consultation.
•	 The membership of the Technology Appraisals 
Committee was to be set broadly. The Committee was to 
be a standing advisory committee of the Institute, which 
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had a very public profile since it was the source of NICE’s 
recommendations for the NHS. Members (unpaid) 
would be appointed for three-year terms (overlapping). 
They were drawn from the NHS, patient and care-giving 
organizations, relevant academic disciplines and the 
pharmaceutical and medical devices industries. Names 
of Appraisal Committee members were posted on the 
Institute’s website.
•	 There would extensive consultation exercises throughout 
the appraisals process, notably with manufacturers of the 
technologies under investigation and their comparators.
There was to be an appeals procedure. There were to be 
three grounds for appeal: that the Institute had failed to 
act fairly and in accordance with the Appraisal Procedure 
set out in its Guidance to Manufacturers and Sponsors; 
that it had prepared Guidance which was perverse in the 
light of the evidence submitted; and that it had exceeded 
its legal powers.
•	 There would consultative processes about process. For 
example, the process through which the procedures for 
HTA were developed involved several committees with 
representation of experts from a variety of stakeholders. 
The outcome was a public document describing the 
process, who may play what role, opportunities for 
consultation, etc8 there would be extensive liaisons with 
the eleven Royal Colleges, seven Independent Academic 
Centres and seven National Collaborating Centres (formed 
by consortia of the Royal Colleges). The Independent 
Academic Centres would do most of the literature 
reviewing, summarising and model re-estimating. They 
were the Health Economics Research Unit and Health 
Services Research Unit, University of Aberdeen; the 
Liverpool Reviews & Implementation Group, University 
of Liverpool; the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, 
University of York; the Peninsula Technology Assessment 
Group, Universities of Exeter and Plymouth; the School 
of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield; 
the Southampton Health Technology Assessment Centre, 
University of Southampton; and the West Midlands HTA 
Collaboration, University of Birmingham.
•	 NICE created the National Collaborating Centres within 
consortia of the royal colleges, professional bodies, 
and patient/carer organizations for developing clinical 
guidelines. They were: National Collaborating Centres 
for Acute Care, Cancer, Chronic Conditions, Mental 
Health, Nursing and Supportive Care, Primary Care, and 
Women and Children’s Health.
•	 There would be considerable joint working with 
NHS Research and Development and the National 
Coordinating Centre for HTA. It coordinated the 
national HTA research programme on behalf of NHS 
Research and Development.
Thus, it was determined that the process of technology 
appraisal was to be open, multi-disciplinary, multi-
professional and multi-institutional, and it would have 
“lay” participation. It was heavily dependent upon people’s 
willingness to serve pro bono. It was plain from the outset 
that very large numbers of people would be involved and the 
Institute itself would be largely a virtual organization. Few 
LMICs might be able to afford anything as comprehensive in 
scale and scope as NICE’s forms of deliberation. NICE itself 
had to modify some processes on grounds of cost. However, 
some approximations might be usefully attempted and then 
developed as experience teaches.
In the absence of a theory of processes, we need to encourage 
imaginative innovation and much sharing of experience. OJB 
have given us a good start. It would be great if it were followed 
up, as experience accumulates, and if more detailed cases 
could be examined, with the challenges that were faced and 
with what success resolved and, perhaps, a differentiation of 
issues that are met everywhere and those that are specific and 
which may have little to offer outside the particular context. 
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Endnote 
[1] For a failed attempt to graft a citizens’ council on to an HTA process, see 
Dobrow et al.6
[2] A framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continually 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care 
by creating an environment and local management for accountability and audit 
of good clinical practice.
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